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Abstract
The share of indirect taxes in tax revenues, speci¯cally consumption taxes, is
quite high in Turkey when compared to other OECD economies. This em-
phasis on indirect taxes in Turkey, as well as other developing economies, is
argued to emerge from the inability of the government to collect direct taxes
because of the existence of a large informal sector that is not easily taxable. It
has been suggested that the recent increase in the indirect taxes puts the bur-
den on mostly the poor, raising concerns of inequality. This paper evaluates
the e±ciency of the current indirect taxes in Turkey by taking into account
distributional concerns. Using data from the 2003 Household Budget Survey,
we estimate elasticities of di®erent consumption goods and services using AIDS
method. We then perform a marginal tax reform analysis to assess the e±ciency
of indirect taxes. Our ¯ndings indicate that there is room for improvement and
the current tax rates are not optimal.
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Indirect taxes in Turkey constitute a large proportion of total tax revenues: their
share in tax revenues has steadily increased since the 1980s, and by 2008 has become
65%. At the same time, tax revenues as a share of GDP have increased from around
10% to around 20%. Figure 1 below depicts the evolution of the shares of direct and
indirect taxes in total tax revenues.1
A casual look at the data suggests that indirect taxes, and speci¯cally taxes on
consumption goods and services, are extensive and come in a variety. Although in
terms of VAT, Turkey is not much di®erent from the OECD average (15.8% vs. 16.6%
of total taxes, respectively) because of the extent of the other two types of taxes on
consumption of speci¯c goods, consumption taxes constitute a signi¯cant share in
tax revenues. Special consumption tax in Turkey was around 24% of tax revenues
in 2006, while this share was around 11% on average for the OECD countries at the
same time period.
This emphasis on indirect taxes in Turkey, and more speci¯cally on taxes on con-
sumption, can be argued to originate due to the inability of the government to collect
direct taxes. An important characteristic of developing economies is the existence of a
large informal sector that is not easily taxable. The size of the informal sector makes
taxation di±cult and costly, and especially so for direct taxes. Since administrative
costs of tax collection in indirect taxes are lower than those in direct taxes, developing
economies rely mostly on indirect taxes.
For example, Zenginobuz et al. (2006) report that in the aftermath of the 2001
crisis, the Turkish government, in pursuing ¯scal tightening, relied increasingly on
taxes on consumption to raise revenues. Furthermore, their ¯ndings indicate that the
burden of these taxes have mostly been on the poor, and for some consumption goods
the taxes were so high that evasion became an attractive option. In evaluating the
results from this study together with the data presented above, an interesting and
important question arises: how e±cient is the current indirect tax system in Turkey
and how does the marginal e±ciency of taxes change with equity concerns? Hence, the
purpose of this paper is to evaluate the marginal e±ciency of indirect taxes in Turkey
by taking into account distributional concerns. The obvious and most important
outcome of indirect taxes is their e®ect on relative prices. As changes in relative
prices have implications for the economy as a whole in terms of demand, production,
tax revenues, and income distribution, ensuring the e±ciency of the indirect tax
system is crucial.
There is a vast literature on the e±ciency of indirect taxes. For example, Nichele
and Robin (1995) assess the consequences of two reforms in the French indirect tax

























































































Figure 1: Share of Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes in Tax Revenues: 1923 - 2009
Source: Revenue Administration (www.gib.gov.tr)
system, namely VAT harmonization and carbon tax. Madden (1995) ¯nds that there
has been room for reform in the indirect tax system in Ireland in the 1980s. Liberati
(2001) studies the distributional e®ects of changes in indirect taxes in Italy, and ¯nds
that a simple two-rate VAT structure is welfare-improving and revenue neutral. Ka-
planoglou and Newbery (2003) assess the indirect tax system in Greece and conclude
that a simpler tax structure is more equitable and more e±cient. Munoz and Cho
(2003) analyze the e®ects of introducing VAT in Ethiopia and compare it to the
incidence of the earlier sales tax in e®ect.
There are three major indirect tax types in Turkey: taxes on consumption goods
and services, taxes on foreign trade and stamp tax. Among the three, taxes on con-
sumption goods and services constitute about 66% of revenues from indirect taxes,
i.e. 42% of total tax revenues as of 2008.2 As the majority of tax revenues come from
consumption taxes, they merit special attention. The consumption taxes are com-
posed of value added tax (VAT), special consumption tax, and special communication
tax. An 18% VAT is levied on all transactions involving consumption of goods and
services, although reduced rates of 1% and 8% apply on certain items such as basic
food, newspapers, etc. VAT has been in e®ect since 1985. Special consumption tax
is levied on cigarettes, gas, energy, alcohol, cell phone services and luxury goods at
2For further details on tax data, see the web site of the Revenue Administration: www.gib.gov.tr,
and Revenue Administration's Activity Report for 2008 on the same web site.
3various rates. In addition, the communication sector, i.e. cable radio and television,
cell phone services and telecommunication, is subject to a special communication tax
levied after the 1999 earthquake to cope with the large budget de¯cits of the time,
which is still in e®ect. As of 2008, revenues from VAT, special consumption tax, and
special communication tax amount to around 25%, 34%, and 4% of revenues from
indirect taxes, respectively.
The analysis of this paper follows a series of studies started by the seminal work
of Ahmad and Stern (1991). Following Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2003), the paper
estimates the marginal social cost of taxation for twelve groups of commodities. Using
a Benthamite social welfare function and addressing distributional concerns, we report
results for various degrees of inequality aversion. Data from Household Budget Survey
(HBS) of 2003 by TurkStat is utilized to estimate a demand system that eventually
allows the computation of elasticities. Using the same data set adjustments re°ecting
equity concerns are made and discussed. The results indicate that there is room for
improvement in terms of e±ciency of the indirect tax system in Turkey.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
methodology used in marginal tax reform analysis. Section 3 summarizes the current
Turkish tax data and the data used in estimations. The fourth section describes the
¯ndings. A discussion of results and conclusion follows in section 5. The methodology
and empirical results of the demand system estimation are provided in the Appendix.
2 Methodology
In this section, we describe brie°y the methodology we employ in tax reform analysis.
In this setup, the government, or the ¯scal authority, maximizes social welfare subject
to the revenue constraint by addressing distributional concerns to ¯nd optimal tax
rates on each commodity group. For further details, see Kaplanoglou and Newbery
(2003).
Consider a model with h = 1;:::;H households and k = 1;:::;K goods. Let p
be the vector of producer prices and q be the vector of consumer prices such that
q = p + t where t is the vector of indirect taxes. Suppose further that vh(yh + g;q)
is the welfare of household h, where yh is net income and g denotes transfers. xh
denotes the vector of demands by household h and X, which is simply the sum of xh
over all h, is the aggregate demand vector. Finally, let V ´ W(v1;v2;:::;vH) be a
Benthamite social welfare function with ¼h as weights.
The question, then, is as follows: What is the value of t that maximizes social







H) subject to R(t) = t
0X ¸ ¹ R (1)
4where ¹ R denotes required revenues.
Assuming producer prices do not change when taxes change,3 it is possible to






























¯h is the social marginal utility of income (and transfers) to household h and ®h is the
private marginal utility of income to household h. The last equality in (2) is derived
by inserting Roy's identity.
The next step is to derive the marginal social productivity of taxing good j. Since
@R=@tj denotes the extra revenues generated by taxing good j by one more unit (of
currency), and ¡@W=@tj denotes the loss in social welfare due to a one unit increase



























where Xj is the sum of xh
j over all h. Here, !k is the budget share of good k, ¿k is
the indirect tax on k divided by the tax-inclusive price of k, and "kj is the cross-price







3For example, following Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), if we assume competitive markets and
constant returns to scale, producer prices will be ¯xed.
5where ¹ ¯ is the average of ¯h over all h. In this regard, it is possible to interpret dj as
the degree of concentration of the consumption of good j on those with high values
of ¯h, i.e. the poor. Then, after some algebra, we can rewrite (2) as
@W
@tj
= ¡¹ ¯djXj (7)
















hence, the marginal social productivity of tax j depends inversely on dj, and positively
on own-price and cross-price elasticities. It is possible to interpret 1=dj as the tax
appeal of good j. For example, if the absolute value of own-price elasticity is high
for good j, the distortionary cost of tax is higher. But distributional concerns in the
form of a high dj in this case o®sets this distortionary e®ect.







1¡° ;° 6= 1
lnch ;° = 1
(9)
where ch is real consumption per capita which is a proxy for income and ° is the
coe±cient of inequality aversion. With this speci¯cation, ¯h = (ch)¡°. Thus, a higher
° implies a higher concern of inequality by the government, and ° = 0 indicates no
inequality aversion.
Using household level data and AIDS estimation methodology, it is possible to
estimate own-price and cross-price elasticities of commodity groups. Then, under
various degrees of inequality aversion, i.e. for various values of °, it is possible to
calculate µj, j = 1;:::;K. It will then be possible to rank these commodity groups
from the least taxable to the most taxable: the lower the value of µj is, the lower the
tax productivity of good j will be. Hence, tax rate on good j should be lower.
3 Data
For the analysis we use the set of elasticity estimates calculated using the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS) methodology of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).4 Estimation
is based on the data from Household Budget Survey 2003 (HBS 2003) conducted
4See Appendix A for details.
6by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat).5 The HBS 2003 is a survey of a
representative random sample of all private households in Turkey. From January
2003 to December 2003, a total of 25,920 households were surveyed (1512 households
from urban and 648 households from rural areas per month). Excluding those who
quit, the survey results in a total sample of 25,764 households.
The survey data report monthly expenditures of households. Household expendi-
tures on goods and services are coded under 198 categories and then these expendi-
tures are aggregated under 12 major commodity groups based on COICOP (Classi-
¯cation of Individual Consumption by Purpose) system. The analysis uses variation
in prices across NUTS2 level regions as well as months of the year to estimate elas-
ticities.6 Table 1 presents these commodity groups along with own price and income
elasticities, indirect tax rates, and the budget shares calculated from HBS 2003.7
The ¯gures are as expected. Food, clothing, health are among the categories with
low elasticity. Transportation has one of the lowest elasticities, possibly re°ecting
the fact that the elasticity estimates are obtained from data covering one year only.
Recreation and culture has the highest elasticity along with furnishing and house
maintenance which covers big ticket items. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco is highly
inelastic, possibly due to prevalence of tobacco addiction.
The other important component of the marginal tax reform analysis is the weighted
average indirect tax rates pertaining to the 12 commodity aggregates. Value-Added-
Tax, Special Consumption Tax, Special Communication Tax and Gambling Tax are
the indirect taxes on commodities that are taken into account when calculating the
tax rates from the relevant resolutions of the Council of Ministers and codes. They
are weighted according to the budget shares of these classi¯cations within their group
in the Household Budget Survey. The average tax rates for the commodity groups,
thus found, are also given in Table 1. Alcohol and tobacco, transportation, and com-
munication are very heavily taxed in Turkey. Food, health, and education are the
least taxed categories.
5While more recent surveys (2004, 2005, and 2006) are also available, the one in 2003 is based on
a much larger sample (about three times larger than the surveys in the following years). Moreover,
later surveys do not disclose the month in which a household is surveyed, information necessary
to measure variation in prices. TurkStat does not publicly disclose the data on region and month.
However, we are able to obtain the information on region and month of the year that an observation
belongs to from HBS 2003 by matching the in°ation adjustment factor (the factor to in°ate the
income) in the data with regional monthly in°ation ¯gures from TurkStat (CPI index for urban
and rural general price levels). In the later years this was not possible because in°ation levels are
relatively low and does not allow us to di®erentiate across di®erent months and regions of the year.
6See footnote 5 on identi¯cation of household location and month of the survey.
7see Table 3 in Appendix A for all elasticities and standard errors obtained using bootstrap.
7Aggregate Commodity Groups Aggregate Average Indirect Own Price Expenditure
Budget Shares Tax Rates Elasticities Elasticities
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 28.50% 8.50% -0.57 0.75
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 4.30% 83.70% -0.11 0.69
Clothing and Footwear 6.30% 15.40% -0.13 1.2
Housing, Water, Gas, Electricity & Other Fuels 27.90% 19.00% -0.74 0.86
Furnishing, House Maintenance & Equipment 5.80% 19.30% -1.65 1.84
Health 2.10% 8.30% -0.05 1.73
Transportation 9.50% 41.70% -0.06 1.45
Communication 4.30% 39.40% -1.06 0.92
Recreation and Culture 2.00% 16.50% -2.05 1.14
Education 1.80% 8.00% -0.68 0.9
Hotels, Cafes, Restaurants 4.00% 18.00% -0.87 0.66
Other Goods and Services 3.50% 20.80% -0.46 1.41
Table 1: Elasticities, average budget shares and average indirect taxes
4 Results
Table 2 below summarizes the results of the marginal tax reform analysis based on
the elasticity estimates in Table 1 above and Table 3 in Appendix A. The analysis
is performed for di®erent levels of inequality aversion. Speci¯cally, the values of the
parameter ° used are 0, 2, and 5. For each inequality aversion level, we present the
distributional characteristic of each category, d, and the marginal social productivity
of tax, µ. The goods and services are ranked from the least taxable to the most in
each ° category.
The di®erences in tax appeal indicates that there is room for improvement in tax
rates. For ° = 0, meaning no concern for equity (and same distributional coe±cient
for all categories), we ¯nd the most likely candidates for higher taxation to be housing,
alcoholic beverage and tobacco, and recreational activities. Hotel and restaurant
expenditures, food, and furnishing follow these categories. Healthcare, clothing, and
others categories are those that are the least desirable for taxation.8 Transportation,
communication, and education follow these. The di®erence in the cost of taxation
is rather small. Our results are similar to Madden (1995) and Kaplanoglou and
Newbery (2003) who ¯nd small di®erences across goods and services in terms of cost
of taxation. Goods that are candidates for higher taxes di®er signi¯cantly from the
results for Greece (Kaplanoglou and Newbery, 2003) where tobacco and recreation
turn out to be the least desirable for a marginal tax increase. On the other hand our
results are in line with Irish case (Madden, 1995). As noted many times in the earlier
literature, the results should be considered with caution considering theoretical issues
in elasticity estimation and optimal tax calculations.
8µ for health category is negative. This implies decrease in tax revenues with further tax on
health. Madden (1995) report such ¯nding for tobacco under some demand speci¯cations with Irish
data and interprets it as a commodity speci¯c La®er e®ect.
8° = 0 ° = 2 ° = 5
Categories d µ Categories d µ Categories d µ
Health 1 -0.11 Health 0.32 -0.33 Health 0.02 -4.94
Other 1 0.36 Other 0.31 1.17 Housing 0.14 6.21
Clothing 1 0.51 Food & Beverages 0.69 1.26 Food & Beverages 0.08 10.74
Transportation 1 0.62 Clothing 0.35 1.45 Other 0.03 12.11
Communication 1 0.67 Communication 0.40 1.67 Hotels, Restaurants 0.05 16.28
Education 1 0.71 Alcohol & Tobacco 0.61 1.67 Alcohol & Tobacco 0.04 23.00
Furnishing 1 0.78 Housing 0.48 1.86 Communication 0.02 29.11
Food & beverages 1 0.86 Hotels, Restaurants 0.36 2.39 Clothing 0.02 32.24
Hotels, restaurants 1 0.87 Transportation 0.26 2.43 Transportation 0.01 63.24
Housing 1 0.89 Furnishing 0.30 2.60 Furnishing 0.01 73.53
Alcohol & Tobacco 1 1.02 Recreation & Culture 0.22 4.95 Recreation & Culture 0.01 135.71
Recreation & Culture 1 1.09 Education 0.14 5.23 Education 0.00 1253.20
Table 2: Distributional characteristics, d, and marginal social productivity, µ
Given the results with no inequality concern, we can now focus on the impact of
the distributional concerns on rankings. Table 2 also displays the results for ° = 2 and
° = 5. As may be expected, food, housing, and alcohol and tobacco categories, which
constitute necessities, become less desirable to be taxed.9 In line with our results,
health and food are among the least taxed items currently (at about 8%). Alcohol and
tobacco, on the other hand are heavily taxed. It is clear from our results that these
taxes constitute a big burden for lower income households. It should also be noted,
however, that our results do not take into consideration health hazards related to
tobacco consumption, neither negative externalities on non-smokers. In the housing
and utilities category, taxes are rather large, about 19%. Housing and especially
utilities could constitute an area where a reduction in taxes may be considered for
equity purposes.
On the other hand furnishing, transportation, and education are now ranked
higher with greater equity consideration. It should be noted that education is pro-
vided for free to a large part of population in Turkey and private schools and other
educational activities are mostly used by wealthier households. Hence, an increase
in taxation is not of a big concern for poor households. However, private schools are
argued to take some of the burden from government and allow it to provide more
resources to the rest of population. Whether this justi¯es a rather low tax rate of 8%
is left for further studies. In transportation the tax rates are already high at about
40% level and in furnishing tax rates are higher than many other categories.
For other categories we do not observe much of a change in the rankings. Recre-
ation and culture is still among the leading candidates for taxing and health ranks
the last for taxation.
9Alcohol and tobacco category is heavily dominated by tobacco which is very widely used in
Turkey especially in lower income brackets.
95 Conclusion
This paper aims to evaluate the indirect taxes in e®ect in Turkey using data from the
2003 Household Budget Survey. After estimating elasticities for twelve commodity
groups using AIDS methodology of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), we follow Ka-
planoglou and Newbery (2003) to conduct a marginal tax reform analysis. When
there is no concern for inequality, we ¯nd the most likely candidates for higher taxa-
tion to be housing, alcoholic beverage and tobacco, and recreational activities while
healthcare and clothing are those that are the least desirable for taxation. Once in-
equality aversion is inserted, food, housing, and alcohol and tobacco categories, which
constitute necessities, become less desirable to be taxed while recreation, education
and furnishings are the categories for which higher taxes are called.
At this point, we would like to note that our analysis is subject to usual caveats of
indirect tax reform studies. We assume competitive markets and disregard tax eva-
sion, an important characteristic of developing countries. Furthermore, the analysis
considers indirect taxes in isolation. It is clear that the system as a whole should be
investigated for a thorough investigation of the e±ciency of taxes, including direct
taxes and institutional conditions. We would like to note, however, that it is still
bene¯cial to evaluate the indirect taxes since they are easier to change and are in fact
often subject to change in Turkey.
An even more important caveat is the tax evasion which is prevalent in Turkey.
The analysis implicitly assumes away tax evasion. If it took place di®erentially across
the goods, marginal optimality would be miscalculated since o±cial tax rates that are
used in the analysis would di®er from the actual rates. Furthermore, if tax evasion
does also di®er across households with di®erent income levels, distributional concerns
may not be properly re°ected in the results. Unfortunately data is lacking on tax
evasion and we leave analysis of tax evasion and e±ciency of indirect taxes for further
studies.
10A Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
A.1 Theory
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) is a
commonly used method in demand system estimation10 AIDS estimation allows the
use of cross-section or time series data, has a °exible expenditure function, satis¯es the
axioms of choice, is compatible with aggregation over consumers and has a functional
form consistent with available household budget data. The model is speci¯ed in the
following form:
wi = ®i +
n X
j=1






¸ijDj + ui; i = 1;::::;n (A1)
where wi is the budget share of the ith good, pi is the price of good i, y is total per
capita expenditure on all n goods, D are other characteristics a®ecting demand, u is
a random disturbance term, and P is a price index de¯ned by:










°kl lnpk lnpl (A2)
The presence of P makes the system highly non-linear which renders the model hard
to estimate. However if prices are collinear, P can be approximated by the Stone's









k is the average budget share of good k. The models using Stone's index|or
more generally, the models using a linear approximation of for the price index|are
referred to as the Linearized Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS).
At this point, it is important to note that one may need to modify the AIDS
method proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer slightly when using data from a house-
hold budget survey. Consider the following situation where household i does not
consume good j at the time of data collection. This may not be because household i
does not prefer to consume good j, but simply because household i does not need to
consume good j at the time of data collection. This is a typical example of a censored
10See, for example, Ozmucur (1995) for Turkey using aggregate data from Turkish national income
accounts for the period 1987Q1 - 1994Q3.
11Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) show that Stone's index does not a®ect the estimates of the
AIDS considerably as long as prices are collinear.
11regression and requires a two-stage estimation. To correct for potential biases that
may arise due to this type of censoring, we use the two-stage estimation method pro-
posed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). According to Shonkwiler and Yen, the demand
system can be written as follows:
w
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i is the actual (unobserved) budget share of good i, wi is the observed budget
share, and d¤
i is the latent variable depending on which the household chooses to
consume good i where this choice is indicated by the observed variable di. Hence,
we only observe the budget shares whenever the household makes an expenditure
on good i. Here, xi and zi are vectors of explanatory variables, and ¹i and µi are
vectors of parameters. Furthermore, ui and vi are random disturbance terms that are
assumed to be bivariate normal with cov(ui;vi) = ±i.
In this framework, the ¯rst stage involves estimating a probit model for the binary
variable di with explanatory variables zi, and the second stage involves the SUR
estimation of the demand system with bias correction using the probability density
function (pdf), Á(z0
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For further details on methodology, see Shonkwiler and Yen (1999).
The use of AIDS estimation will enable us to calculate the own-price, cross-price
and income elasticities of demand using the following:




¡ (1 + ¯i) (A8)














Several other variables can be added in the main equation (A1) of the AIDS system
as well as to the ¯rst stage estimation of presence of any expenditure through probit
model, in order to capture some other variables' e®ects on the budget shares of
individuals in addition to logarithm of prices and real expenditure. It can be expected
that socio-demographic or socio-economic characteristics of the households also play
a role in the consumption decisions or consumption patterns of the households.
Household size can be an important determinant in the expenditures of the house-
holds. Alpay and Koc (2000) found a negative relation between household size and
food and housing expenditures. The OECD equivalent household size12 variable is
added to the main budget shares equations to see the e®ects of the size of the house-
hold on consumption. In addition, age of household head is controlled through three
dummies.
The expenditure patterns of the households can show variations according to the
season. We capture the seasonality in the shares of the aggregate commodity groups
by adding three dummy variables for spring, summer and autumn into the budget
share equations. In addition a dummy for urban residents and two dummies repre-
senting the education level of the household head are also included in the AIDS model.
Finally, to control for regional di®erences a series of dummies are added to represent
Istanbul and seven main regions in Turkey. Also included are some additional control
variables that can be thought as relevant for particular goods and services. Presence
of private car for transportation services, dummies for new year and religious holidays
for alcohol and tobacco are among such variables.
12The OECD equivalent household size is calculated by summing the weights attached to the
members of the household. The weights are; 1 for the ¯rst adult in the household, 0.5 for members









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Aggregate Commodity Groups Aggregate Average Indirect Own Price Expenditure
Budget Shares Tax Rates Elasticities Elasticities
Food 32.82% 18.32% -0.71 0.56
Clothing 6.34% 15.43% -0.98 1.2
Housing 32.22% 21.75% -0.74 0.87
Furnishing 5.76% 19.29% -0.84 1.64
Health 2.07% 8.26% -1.34 0.74
Transportation 9.47% 41.73% -0.25 1.94
Entertainment 2.03% 16.51% -0.4 1.7
Education 1.82% 8.00% -1.24 1.94
Tourism 3.97% 18.00% -1.07 1.1
Other 3.51% 20.76% -0.84 1.52
Table 4: Elasticities, average budget shares and average indirect taxes with the 2003
HBS data, using 1994 classi¯cations
B Alternative Elasticity Estimates
As an alternative to our own elasticity calculations we also consider elasticities from
an earlier study by Koc and Alpay (2000). Koc and Alpay use the 1994 HBS, which
has ten aggregate commodity groups: food, clothing, housing, furnishing, health,
transportation, entertainment, education, tourism, and others. The Alcoholic Bever-
ages & Tobacco, and Communication categories from HBS 2003 are included in the
Food & Non-Alcoholic Beverages and the Housing, Water, Gas, Electricity & Other
Fuels categories respectively to match the categories in the 1994. Table 4 reports the
new categories, own price and income elasticities, as well as average budget shares
and tax rates.
It should be noted that using the elasticities calculated on HBS 1994 may be
misleading in some respects. First, the categories that did not exist in 1994, alcohol
& tobacco, and communication, are currently heavily taxed and merging these two
commodity groups with others may be problematic. Second, there have been major
changes in health and education over time and private providers were more common
in 2000s compared to 1990s, which may have changed the elasticities of these services.
We also repeat the calculations using elasticity estimates of Koc and Alpay (2000)
and report the results in Table 5. The most dramatic di®erence is in health and
entertainment expenditures. Health is ranked as most taxable with new elasticities
while it was ranked the last in our own calculations. This might be due to increased
role of private sector in healthcare services during the 2000s compared to 1990s making
health expenditure more elastic in recent years. In contrast entertainment is ranked
as least taxable in using elasticities from Koc and Alpay (2000) while it was ranked
as one of the most taxable using our elasticities. Other than these goods and services
rankings do not di®er radically. The movement of goods and elasticities in terms of
15° = 0 ° = 2 ° = 5
Categories d µ Categories d µ Categories d µ
Other 1 0.43 Food 0.68 1.17 Food 0.15 5.43
Education 1 0.69 Other 0.31 1.38 Housing 0.15 5.47
Entertainment 1 0.71 Housing 0.47 1.78 Other 0.05 8.68
Food 1 0.79 Clothing 0.36 2.43 Tourism 0.06 15.96
Housing 1 0.84 Tourism 0.36 2.59 Clothing 0.04 22.10
Transportation 1 0.86 Health 0.32 3.06 Health 0.04 25.43
Clothing 1 0.87 Furnishing 0.30 3.07 Furnishing 0.03 31.46
Furnishing 1 0.92 Entertainment 0.22 3.23 Transportation 0.03 34.07
Tourism 1 0.93 Transportation 0.26 3.29 Entertainment 0.02 35.07
Health 1 0.98 Education 0.14 4.96 Education 0.00 229.52
Table 5: Distributional characteristics, d, and marginal social productivity, µ Koc
and Alpay (2000)
FO CLO HOU FUR HEA TRA ENT EDU TOU OTH
FO -0.71 0 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.15
CLO -0.21 -0.98 -0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.1 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.01
HOU 0.02 -0.02 -0.74 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
FUR -0.59 -0.01 -0.32 -0.84 -0.04 0.3 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01
HEA -0.14 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -1.33 0.46 -0.14 0.42 -0.24 0.37
TRA -0.87 0.06 -0.35 0.31 0.11 -0.25 -0.16 -0.2 0.15 -0.73
ENT -0.16 -0.02 -0.34 -0.12 0.03 -0.54 -0.39 0.13 0.01 -0.3
EDU 0.79 -0.27 -0.79 -0.21 0.59 -0.96 -0.19 -1.24 0.17 -0.19
TOU -0.76 0.15 0.26 -0.14 -0.24 0.47 0.02 0.11 -1.07 0.1
OTH 0.63 -0.02 -0.36 0 0.12 -0.93 -0.11 -0.04 0.03 -0.84
Table 6: Marshallian Elasticities from Koc and Alpay (2000)
tax appeal is similar to the results with our own elasticity calculations since the same
distributional concern adjustment is made.
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